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23.02.2026 11:09 AMEconomic calendar
February 23
23 February, 00:45 / New Zealand / Retail trade volume change, Q4 / prev.: 0.7% / actual: 1.9% / forecast: 0.6% / NZD/USD – down
Retail sales posted a strong gain of 1.9% in the previous quarter, signaling notable consumer momentum. The forecast for the next quarter assumes a substantial slowdown to 0.6%, reflecting expected cooling after the seasonal spike. If Q4 comes in at the forecasted 0.6%, it would signal weakening consumer activity and weigh on the New Zealand dollar.
23 February, 12:00 / Germany / Ifo Business Climate Index, February / prev.: 87.6 / actual: 87.6 / forecast: 88.4 / EUR/USD – up
Germany's Ifo business climate index stayed at a low 87.6 last month, near six?month lows. Current?situation readings improved slightly while expectations softened. Some sectors show divergent dynamics:
23 February, 12:00 / Germany / Ifo Expectations Index, February / prev.: 89.7 / actual: 89.5 / forecast: 90.5 / EUR/USD – up
The Ifo expectations index slipped to 89.5 in January — a low since May last year — but still represents cautious optimism among managers and investors. The forecasted rebound to 90.5 reflects hopes for improving external conditions and demand. If expectations reach the projection, it will be seen as a positive signal for investment activity and strengthen the euro versus the dollar.
23 February, 16:30 / US / Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), December / prev.: -0.42 / actual: -0.04 / forecast: 0.10 / USDX (6?currency USD index) – up
The CFNAI rose to -0.04 last month, indicating a reduction in negative pressure and a pickup in production. Manufacturing's contribution turned positive after a sharp decline. The forecast for the next month expects the index to move into positive territory at 0.10, which would point to an economic activity revival and strengthen the case for the dollar.
23 February, 18:00 / US / Durable goods orders (m/m), December / prev.: -1.2% / actual: 2.7% / forecast: 1.1% / USDX – down
New orders rebounded by 2.7% last month, thanks to a surge in the transportation segment and aircraft orders, which pushed the overall figure up. The forecast for the next month projects a more moderate 1.1% rise, implying a slowdown in the expansion rate. If December's reading confirms that slowdown, it could temper the positive impact on the dollar.
23 February, 18:30 / US / Texas Manufacturing Business Activity Index (February) / prev.: -11.3 / actual: -1.2 / forecast: -3.5 / USDX – down
The Dallas business activity index improved significantly in January, rising to -1.2. After a very weak December, there was a clear pickup in:
24 February
24 February, 08:00 / Euro area / Passenger car registrations, January / prev.: 2.1% / actual: 5.8% / forecast: -4.8% / EUR/USD – down
In December, car registrations in the EU showed a notable increase and reached a six?month high. This was supported by:
However, the forecast for January points to a sharp drop in registrations, reflecting the risk of a return to seasonal weakness and possible logistical or demand shocks. A decline in auto registrations would weaken domestic demand prospects and reduce the sector's positive contribution to the region's economy. If January confirms the projected -4.8%, it will add pressure on the euro.
24 February, 16:15 / US / ADP private?sector weekly hiring / prev.: 7.75k / actual: 10.25k / forecast: – / USDX (6?currency USD index) – volatile
Average weekly private?sector hiring accelerated over the reporting period, reflecting a recovery in job creation after a temporary slowdown. A sustained increase in vacancies across sectors points to renewed business activity and supports the case for a stabilizing labor market. Since regular weekly unemployment reports from the US Department of Labor have resumed, the ADP private hiring figure has moved to the background, but it can still trigger short?term dollar volatility depending on how the market reads the strength of hiring.
24 February, 14:00 / UK / CBI Retail Sales Balance, February / prev.: -44 / actual: -17 / forecast: -16 / GBP/USD – up
The CBI retail sales balance in the UK improved sharply and moved out of deeply negative territory. Such an upswing may indicate a turnaround in the retail sector after a weak period. Retailers note that the improvement:
The forecast implies a further easing of the downturn in business expectations and should support sterling appreciation.
24 February, 17:00 / US / S&P/Case?Shiller Home Price Index, December / prev.: 1.3% / actual: 1.4% / forecast: 1.5% / USDX – up
In November, the Case-Shiller index showed the first year-on-year increase in many months. Growth remained modest and well below highs in many markets; differences across cities persist. Interestingly, data collection and publication were interrupted for a time, so two readings will be released in February:
The December forecast assumes a gradual further recovery in prices of around 1.5%. That would boost the chances of stronger consumer confidence and support the dollar.
24 February, 18:00 / US / Consumer Confidence (Conference Board), February / prev.: 94.3 / actual: 84.5 / forecast: 86.0 / USDX – up
The Conference Board index in January came in below expectations and was nearly 10 points lower than December. This decline indicates that consumer confidence remains subdued. At the same time, the index is near its long?term average, and the forecast implies a moderate improvement. If February rises to the projected 86 points, it will strengthen confidence in consumer demand and be a supportive factor for the dollar.
24 February, 18:00 / US / Richmond Manufacturing Index, February / prev.: -7 / actual: -6 / forecast: -4 / USDX – up
The Richmond index improved to -6 in January after a deep slump. Amid continued regional pessimism, the recovery reflected a moderation in declines in shipments and new orders. These parameters remain important for forward guidance, and some improvement in business confidence is expected for:
Employment and wage growth remain constrained, and cost pressures persist, limiting pass-through into prices. If the February reading comes in around the projected -4, it will be perceived as a strengthening of local industrial dynamics and will support the dollar.
25 February
25 February, 00:30 / US / Crude oil inventories (API) / prev.: 13.4 mln bbl / actual: -0.609 mln bbl / forecast: – / Brent – volatile
Over the reporting week, inventories fell by about 0.6 million barrels after a recent sharp spike, which may indicate a partial rebalancing of supply and demand. Declines in gasoline and distillate stocks point to stronger domestic demand and refinery activity. But volatile inventory dynamics in recent weeks have made the market sensitive to any new data. The American Petroleum Institute's release is unofficial, yet it still sparks oil volatility.
25 February, 03:30 / Australia / Consumer inflation, January / prev.: 3.4% / actual: 3.8% / forecast: 3.7% / AUD/USD – down
Inflation accelerated to 3.8% in the last month of 2025, posing a challenge for the Reserve Bank of Australia. Price stability was disrupted by key drivers:
The core adjusted index also remained elevated, signaling broad price pressures across sectors. The monthly spike shows some of the increase is both seasonal and structural. If January's actual inflation comes in at the forecast 3.7%, it would reduce arguments for maintaining a tighter monetary stance and weigh on the Australian dollar.
25 February, 10:00 / Germany / GDP growth, Q1 preliminary / prev.: 0.3% / actual: 0.3% / forecast: 0.4% / EUR/USD – up
Germany closed the previous quarter with stable growth and showed recovery in several sectors after a prolonged weak period. The forecast for the start of the year points to acceleration to 0.4%, implying a broader revival of domestic demand and production. If confirmed, this would signal a recovery in regional economic growth and be supportive for the euro.
25 February, 10:00 / Germany / GfK consumer climate (leading) for March / prev.: -26.9 / actual: -24.1 / forecast: -23.5 / EUR/USD – up
German consumer sentiment improved to -24.1 in February amid:
Higher willingness to buy and a lower propensity to save indicate some pickup in consumer activity. However, sentiment remains low and vulnerable to geopolitical risk. If the March reading approaches the forecasted -23.5, it will support the euro.
25 February, 13:00 / Euro area / Consumer inflation, January / prev.: 2.0% / actual: 2.0% / forecast: 1.7% / EUR/USD – down
In December, inflation in the euro area was 2.0% year?on?year, roughly at the ECB's target. The January reading may reflect easing price pressures, driven by:
25 February, 18:30 / US / Crude oil inventories (EIA) / prev.: 8.53 mln bbl / actual: -9.014 mln bbl / forecast: -3.052 mln bbl / Brent – down
Commercial crude stocks in the US fell by about 9.0 million barrels over the reporting week. After a recent large buildup, this draw was the largest in several months. Sharp declines in gasoline and distillate inventories point to stronger domestic demand and increased refinery shipments. The oil market will watch how sustainable this drawdown is; if next week shows inventory growth, that could pressure Brent prices.
25 February, 19:00 / Russia / Industrial production, January / prev.: 0.4% / actual: 3.7% / forecast: 4.0% / USD/RUB – down
In December, Russian industrial production showed a notable year-on-year increase of 3.7% — the strongest gain in a year. This was driven by:
The result suggests a temporary acceleration in industrial activity amid sectoral recovery impulses. The forecast expects positive dynamics to continue. If January confirms growth around 4.0%, it would strengthen the ruble thanks to an improved macro picture and support for external revenues.
Scheduled speeches and events on February 23-25
23 February, 16:00 / US / Speech by Christopher Waller, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve / USDX
23 February, 20:30 / Euro area / Speech by ECB President Christine Lagarde / EUR/USD
24 February, 13:30 / Euro area / Speech by Pedro Machado, ECB Supervisory Board / EUR/USD
24 February, 16:00 / US / Speech by Austan Goolsbee, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago / USDX
24 February, 17:00 / US / Speech by Raphael Bostic, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta / USDX
24 February, 17:00 & 23:15 / US / Speech by Susan Collins, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston / USDX
24 February, 17:15 / US / Speech by Christopher Waller, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve / USDX
24 February, 17:30 / US / Speech by Lisa Cook, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve / USDX
24 February, 19:00 / Euro area / Speech by Anneli Tuominen, ECB Supervisory Board / EUR/USD
24 February, 23:15 / US / Speech by Thomas Barkin, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond / USDX
25 February, 11:40 / Australia / Speech by Reserve Bank of Australia Governor Michele Bullock / AUD/USD
25 February, 12:10 / Euro area / Speech by Pedro Machado, ECB Supervisory Board / EUR/USD
25 February, 17:35 / US / Speech by Thomas Barkin, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond / USDX
25 February, 19:00 / US / Speech by Jeffery Schmid, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City / USDX
25 February, 21:20 / US / Speech by Alberto Musalem, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis / USDX
Representatives of leading central banks are also scheduled to speak during these days. Their comments commonly trigger FX volatility as they may signal regulators' future rate plans.
"I, as President of the United States of America, hereby immediately raise the global customs tariff for countries — many of which have been 'stealing' from the US with impunity for decades (until I came to power!) — from 10% to the fully permitted and legally justified level of 15%." In fact, this post by an aggrieved Trump is symbolic in every way — from the "thieving" partners to the aggrandizement of his historical role. And for those who didn't get the point, the US president reminded once again: "I settled eight wars, whether you like it or not, including India, Pakistan, the nuclear one. It could have been nuclear."
Speaking of wars, the US Navy carrier strike group led by USS Gerald R. Ford, having passed through Gibraltar, entered the Mediterranean and is heading toward the Middle East. The group includes the destroyers USS Mahan, USS Winston S. Churchill and USS Bainbridge, armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles with an operational range of about 1,600 km, and four squadrons of F/A-18 Super Hornets — a total of 48 combat aircraft — are based on Ford's deck. Military sources estimate these forces will be placed at the disposal of US Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Eastern Mediterranean within a few days.
Together with the carrier already on duty in the Arabian Sea, USS Abraham Lincoln, this will give CENTCOM two carrier strike groups. Washington's rhetoric is raising the tension of possible scenarios. Donald Trump signaled that a military operation against Iran could begin within 10–15 days if terms on Iran's nuclear program cannot be agreed upon. Analysts and market participants are openly discussing the likelihood of escalation. Oil prices and shares in the metals sector have reacted with increased volatility, and portfolio reshuffling has begun.
Alongside the geopolitical stress, key US economic indicators are deteriorating. Investors are pulling money out of American assets at the fastest pace in at least 16 years, and GDP growth in the fourth quarter was very modest — only 1.4%. After a strong jump to 4.4% earlier, such a slump alarms experts. Other released data does not encourage:
Overall, the economy enters 2026 with a noticeable degree of uncertainty. A short pause in growth and heightened political?geopolitical risks create a complex backdrop for monetary and fiscal policy. The White House's task of combining foreign policy toughness with economic stimulus looks increasingly difficult to carry out without increasing market volatility. In these conditions, investors and corporate managers need to remain flexible in position management and closely monitor new activity data as well as military and diplomatic developments.
The Fed on pause — hawkish or dovish?
The minutes of the FOMC meeting on January 27–28 confirmed what many had already intuited: the Federal Reserve is currently in a wait?and?see mode, but that pause is no longer one?sidedly "dovish." The minutes show a clear shift in the balance of risks — from earlier concerns about labor market weakness toward the threat that inflation may remain dangerously high. That shift is the most important message for markets. The regulator now judges the risk of persistent inflation to be unresolved, while concerns about a major deterioration in employment have eased.
These assessments were made before a delayed jobs report was released. January nonfarm payrolls turned out to be more resilient than many had feared. As a result, the Fed's key takeaway can be put simply: the regulator has more reason now to wait and not rush into easing. "Patience" does not mean abandoning the option to tighten — the minutes clearly show the Fed is considering language that allows for two?sided risk. In other words, a path to rate cuts is possible, but if inflation dynamics worsen, a return to tighter policy is not ruled out.
Markets reacted with an adjustment, not a shock. Expectations for a rate cut in March have diminished further, and the probability of easing beginning in June fell from 69% to roughly 54%. That means traders are less confident about a fast easing cycle and have revised the timing accordingly. But there was no massive, one?time rebalancing of positions. Prices have already partially priced in the Fed's move to a "hawkish pause." For businesses and financial managers, that means scenarios of prolonged cheap liquidity are no longer the base case.
Which signals should be watched next?
Supreme Court says no!
"Trump's 2025 decision to impose tariffs on goods from a large number of countries was illegal," the US Supreme Court said on Friday. The Court's ruling on the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) represents a notable legal rebalance in the administration's trade war. In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that IEEPA does not grant the President the authority to impose broad, nationwide tariffs in the manner that had been done in recent months. Formally, this undermines the legal basis for the so-called "Liberation Day" tariffs, which covered most US trade partners and ranged from 10% to 50%.
This decision is an important constitutional precedent. The Court limited executive power where the administration had tried to act without explicit congressional approval. The Court did not order automatic refunds of duties already paid. The question of reimbursements and compensation will most likely remain the subject of separate, potentially lengthy judicial and administrative procedures. In theory, importers and foreign partners now have grounds to challenge the levies, and the disputed sums are estimated in the $160–200 billion range. But in practice the refund process will be long and complex.
The administration quickly adapted, but its freedom of action narrowed
The executive branch's reaction showed a willingness to keep the tariff program operational, but on a different legal basis. In the hours after the verdict, the White House switched to other trade statutes — first and foremost to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows temporary measures to protect the balance of payments (up to 150 days without congressional approval) — and also launched investigations under Sections 232 (national security) and 301 (retaliation against unfair trade practices). In practice, the administration retained tools for imposing restrictions, but lost the operational freedom and the ability to make instantaneous, unlimited, unilateral decisions.
That is why, formally, tariffs have not disappeared — they have simply taken on a more complex, procedurally justified character. Going forward, the average level of customs rates may fluctuate, potentially shifting from extreme tariff levels toward more targeted measures in the 8–15 percent range. But the major change is different: imposing tariffs now requires clear procedures, investigations and is more vulnerable to legal challenge. At the customs level, the decision means that US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) must receive explicit instructions to stop or reconfigure the collection of duties found not to comply with IEEPA. Importers have a legal argument for seeking refunds, but filing and processing such claims will be a protracted process.
What matters for markets and business:
The essence of the Supreme Court's IEEPA ruling is clear: unilateral, broad?scale tariff maneuvers carried out by presidential fiat proved legally vulnerable. But this does not mean the administration has lost the tools to exert trade pressure — they have simply moved into other legal "corridors," each with its own procedures, timeframes and legal risks. Every measure must now pass a front of evidentiary and procedural checks.
Below is an expanded explanation of the main alternatives the White House is now turning to, and their practical limitations.
Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962). This mechanism is traditionally used for measures "in the interest of national security." An important principle: Section 232 applies only to specific industries or products where it can be formally shown that imports affect national security — it is not a universal key to apply tariffs "against everyone." A full investigation is required before restrictions can be imposed; this can take up to 270 days, and the outcome must be followed by consultations with trading partners and a reasoned report that can be challenged internationally. In practice Section 232 allows measures to be maintained for strategic segments (for example, metals or certain types of equipment), but it does not authorize instant, indiscriminate tariffs on all imports.
Section 301 (Trade Act of 1974). This tool is critical for retaliatory measures against "unfair trade practices" — subsidies, intellectual?property theft, and discriminatory barriers. Unlike IEEPA, Section 301 has a more formalized process. USTR investigations are lengthy (typically 12–18 months); they require proving a causal link between a foreign partner's practice and harm to US industry, public hearings, a mandatory 60-day consultation with the targeted party, and — importantly — measures must be proportionate to documented harm. In practice, the US has often faced difficulties proving "unfair practices." The US has lost disputed Section 301 cases in arbitration, which makes the tool effective but risky and in need of a robust documentary base.
Section 338 (Tariff Act of 1930). Historically tied to anti?discrimination trade provisions, in a modern context, Section 338 allows for a maximum rate of up to 50% where discriminatory policies against US goods are found. In practice, this instrument has been used very rarely. Its evidentiary basis and judicial verification under current conditions are uncertain, so Section 338 remains more of a "nuclear option" with high legal barriers and unclear practical feasibility.
Section 122 (Trade Act of 1974) — the emergency option the White House switched to after the IEEPA verdict. Section 122 permits the President to impose temporary tariffs (in case of a recognized "substantial" balance?of?payments problem) without prior congressional approval, but only for a limited period — 150 days — and any extension requires congressional agreement. In practice, this means the White House can quickly implement, for example, a global tariff of 10%–15%, but it cannot impose indefinite 100%+ rates or leave such measures in place permanently without Congressional oversight. Section 122 reduces operational flexibility compared with IEEPA and makes measures more temporary, formally limited and open to legal challenge.
The President's administration has lost the broadest and most "instantaneous" instrument (IEEPA), but not the capacity to exert trade pressure. It is now forced to act differently — through procedures, investigations and temporary measures, each of which involves formal stages, deadlines and grounds for legal disputes. This reduces the speed and bluntness of policy, but does not render it impotent. On the contrary, tariff policy is likely to become more targeted, formally justified and arguably more resilient to immediate backlash from partners — because each measure must now pass a test of evidence and procedure.
Practical consequences are already evident. Customs authorities (CBP) need clear directives: until those directives are issued, physical collection of duties under previous rules may effectively continue, creating legal and operational uncertainty for importers. The theoretical right to refunds exists (and experts estimate disputed amounts in the hundreds of billions), but the road to actual reimbursements will run through protracted litigation and administrative proceedings.
Moreover, the international context is changing: trading partners have legitimate grounds to revisit or "reframe" deals concluded under the IEEPA framework and to seek more favorable renegotiations in light of the new ruling. The European Union has already publicly stated it is carefully analyzing the Supreme Court decision and is demanding clarity from the US. Brussels stresses the importance of predictability and stable trade rules and highlights the need for coordinated approaches, limiting the scope for "rapid" retaliatory measures.
Investors today are drawing a clear distinction between a rise in geopolitical risk and the actual inevitability of events. Against the backdrop of worsening tensions in the Middle East, oil prices have jumped sharply, and gold has regained status as a safe?haven asset. Both reflect heightened fears of supply disruptions and a general uncertainty premium. At the same time, equity indices and currencies with high beta sensitivity have shown only moderate signs of stress. Markets have taken a wait-and-see stance, while buyer demand still keeps major benchmarks near record levels.
